Chicago-Kent Law Review
Volume 74
Issue 4 Symposium on Law, Psychology, and
the Emotions

Article 6

October 1999

The Limits of Social Norms
Jeffrey J. Rachlinski

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.kentlaw.iit.edu/cklawreview
Part of the Law Commons

Recommended Citation
Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, The Limits of Social Norms, 74 Chi.-Kent L. Rev. 1537 (2000).
Available at: https://scholarship.kentlaw.iit.edu/cklawreview/vol74/iss4/6

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by Scholarly Commons @ IIT Chicago-Kent College of Law.
It has been accepted for inclusion in Chicago-Kent Law Review by an authorized editor of Scholarly Commons @ IIT
Chicago-Kent College of Law. For more information, please contact jwenger@kentlaw.iit.edu,
ebarney@kentlaw.iit.edu.

THE LIMITS OF SOCIAL NORMS
JEFFREY

J. RACHLINSKI*

No society can function if it cannot constrain the self-serving
behavior of its members. Societies that cannot control socially
destructive behavior collapse into dysfunction; they become
dangerously crime-ridden, as in some of America's inner cities, or
completely anarchic, as in parts of the Balkans and central Africa.'
Clear rules enforced by legal sanctions deter a great deal of socially
destructive conduct, but social norms enforced by informal sanctions
might create even more powerful constraints. 2 If so, then gaining
control over dysfunctional societies might depend more upon using or
manipulating social norms than upon enforcing the law. Decades of
research conducted by social psychologists on social norms, however,
suggests three important obstacles to the use of social norms: First,
antisocial norms, once established, are hard to dislodge; second, even
if people adhere to positive social norms, determining when they are
triggered is difficult; third, subtle aspects of situations can induce
antisocial conduct, seemingly even against social norms.
Most legal scholarship addressing the control of antisocial
behavior addresses formal sanctions rather than social norms. 3 This is
not surprising; formal sanctions are more familiar to lawyers and
punishing undesirable antisocial conduct is the most straightforward
means of maintaining social order. Formal sanctions almost certainly
provide a critical degree of control over antisocial conduct, but they
4
are costly, both to society and to the individual being punished.
Incarceration, in particular, can produce unintended costs to
* Professor of Law, Cornell Law School. Ph.D., Psychology, Stanford University, 1994;
J.D., Stanford University, 1993; B.A., The Johns Hopkins University, 1988; M.A., Psychology,
The Johns Hopkins University, 1988. I thank Chris Guthrie and Emily Sherwin for their helpful
comments on this paper.
1. See Tracey L. Meares & Dan M. Kahan, Law and (Norms of) Order in the Inner City,

32 L. & Soc'Y. REv. 805, 812-13 (1998).
2. See generally Dan M. Kahan, Social Meaning and the Economic Analysis of Crime, 27 J.
LEGAL STUD. 609 (1998).
3. See Robert C. Ellickson, Law and Economics Discovers Social Norms, 27 J. LEGAL
STUD. 537, 542-43 (1998).
4. See John J. Donohue III & Peter Siegelman, Allocating Resources Among Prisonsand
Social Programs in the Battle Against Crime, 27 J. LEGAL STUD. 1,3-6 (1998).
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individuals, especially in communities in which the rate of
incarceration is high.5
Partly in response to the staggering costs of incarceration, some
legal scholars argue that informal social norms provide a better means

of controlling antisocial conduct. 6 This observation builds upon a
growing body of legal scholarship concerning social norms. 7 This new

"law and social norms" scholarship adopts a more subtle approach to
social behavior than identifying situations that should trigger formal
rewards and sanctions. It accounts for the prominence of group
membership and social approval as sources of rewards and
punishments. 8 This new field has developed several positive and
normative implications of social norms. On the positive side, the
scholarship asserts that groups develop and enforce norms of conduct
apart from formal legal sanctions. 9 Perhaps more significantly, this

scholarship might hold valuable normative lessons for policymakers
interested in reducing crime as an alternative to incarceration.
The law and social norms scholarship identifies two ways in
which reformers can take advantage of the power of social norms.
First, changes in law can influence social norms. For example, passing
a law against smoking in public places had a dramatic effect on

smokers, not because of the formal penalty for public smoking (which
is hardly ever imposed) but because it empowered nonsmokers to
levy social sanctions on smokers.1

Changes in law might also inspire

changes in preferences. 1 Scholars refer to this as the "expressive"
5. See Meares & Kahan, supra note 1, at 813.
6. See generally Dan M. Kahan, Social Influence, Social Meaning, and Deterrence, 83 VA.
L. REV. 349 (1997); Meares & Kahan, supra note 1, at 812.
7. See, e.g., Lawrence Lessig, The Regulation of Social Meaning, 62 U. CHI. L. REV. 943
(1995); Richard H. McAdams, The Origin,Development, and Regulation of Norms, 96 MICH. L.
REV. 338 (1997); Richard A. Posner, Social Norms and the Law: An Economic Approach, 87
AM. ECON. REV. 365 (1997); Eric A. Posner, The Regulation of Groups: The Influence of Legal
and Non-Legal Sanctions on Collective Action, 63 U. CHI. L. REV. 133 (1996); Cass R. Sunstein,
Social Norms and Social Roles, 96 COLUM. L. REV. 903 (1996). Owing to the number of
scholars at the University of Chicago doing this work, some have referred to it as the "New
Chicago School." See, e.g., Lawrence Lessig, The New Chicago School, 27 J. LEGAL STUD. 661
(1998).
8. See McAdams, supra note 7, at 341-42.
9. See generally ROBERT C. ELLICKSON, ORDER WiTHouT LAW: How NEIGHBORS
SETrLE DISPuTEs (1991); Lisa Bernstein, Opting Out of the Legal System: Extralegal
ContractualRelations in the Diamond Industry, 21 J. LEGAL STUD. 115 (1992); Eric A. Posner,
supra note 7, at 137-44.
10. See Robert Cooter, Expressive Law and Economics, 27 J. LEGAL STUD. 585, 594-95
(1998).
11. See Cass R. Sunstein, Endogenous Preferences, EnvironmentalLaw, 22 J. LEGAL STUD.
217, 230-34 (1993).
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function of law.12 Second, subtle and inexpensive changes in a social
setting can signal different social norms. For example, fixing broken
windows, cleaning up trash, erasing graffiti, and planting flowers in a
neighborhood can have a dramatic effect on crime rates because
tidiness can "signal" a community's intolerance for lawbreaking. 3
The interaction between law and social norms arguably identifies
ways to reduce crime that are less expensive and more humane than
traditional approaches. A change in law that does not need to be
enforced, or is only minimally enforced, is not costly to society or to
the individuals who are deterred from breaking the law by a new
social taboo.
Likewise, cleaning neighborhoods is much more
humane than identifying and sentencing lawbreakers to lengthy
periods of incarceration. Historically, those who have argued against
incarceration have advocated social programs designed to fight
poverty as a substitute crime control measure. 14 Such programs are
expensive, and do not always succeed, or generate other unwanted
consequences. The law and social norms scholarship suggests novel
alternatives to the choice between expensive social programs and
incarceration.
Manipulating social norms to reduce antisocial conduct will only
be a successful strategy if the underlying theories describing how
social norms affect behavior are both accurate and reasonably
complete. Although the law and social norms scholarship relies
largely on observational and anecdotal support, it presents a good
case that social norms influence behavior in ways that policymakers
can use. The diamond industry is probably governed by the informal
norms Professor Bernstein identifies, 5 sprucing up a community
probably reduces crime as Professor Kahan argues,'16 and changes in
the law probably affects people's perception of conduct such as
dueling and wearing hockey helmets. 7 If the theories explaining
these phenomena are incomplete, however, then the law and social
norms scholarship is merely a post hoc effort to accommodate some
anomalous phenomena. 8 The law and social norms theories might

12. See Cooter, supra note 10, at 595. See generally Cass R. Sunstein, On the Expressive
Functionof Law, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 2021 (1996).
13. See Kahan, supra note 6, at 352-61.
14. See, e.g., Donohue & Siegelman, supra note 4.
15. See Bernstein, supra note 9.
16. See Kahan, supra note 6, at 352-61.
17. See Lessig, supra note 7, at 968-71.
18. See Sunstein, supra note 7, at 945.
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not generalize to new situations, making them useless to policymakers.
Law and social norms theory so far has relied upon rational
choice theory and game theory for its intellectual foundation,19 but
sociologists and social psychologists have a long history of studying
social norms. Sociology even includes a school of thought known as
"symbolic interactionism," which is stunningly similar to the signaling
theories in the new legal scholarship on social norms. 20 For their part,
social psychologists have been studying social norms and social
21
influence since the 1930s.
Decades of social psychological research on social norms merits
more than just a tip-of-the-hat from law and social norms scholars. 22
As early as 1936, a prominent social psychologist, Muzafir Sherif,
published a monograph describing empirical research on the origins
and implications of social norms. 23 One of the founders of modern
social psychology, Kurt Lewin, demonstrated how to manipulate
social settings to alter social norms during World War II as part of an
effort to reduce demand for scarce products needed for the war
effort.2 4 Social psychologists conducted decades of research on social
norms and social influence that followed these early leaders, which
could enrich the law and social norms scholar's anecdotal style with
rigorous empiricism.
The social psychological research, in fact, provides some
systematic support for the theories proposed by the social norms
scholars. Social psychologists have conducted numerous empirical
studies which support two basic tenets of the law and social norms
scholars: (1) that groups develop and impose norms on their
members, and (2) that the apparent behavior of others can alter the
social meaning of a situation in ways that profoundly affect behavior.
This research provides direct support for the signaling theories

19. See, e.g., Randal C. Picker, Simple Games in a Complex World: A Generative Approach
to the Adoption of Norms, 64 U. CHI. L. REV. 1225 (1997).
20. See generally JOEL M. CHARON, SYMBOLIC INTERAcTIONISM: AN INTRODUCTION, AN
INTERPRETATION, AN INTEGRATION (6th ed. 1998); ERVING GOFFMAN, THE PRESENTATION
OF SELF IN EVERYDAY LIFE (1959) (providing an early account of the importance of symbolic
actions).
21. See, e.g., MUZAFIR SHERIF, THE PSYCHOLOGY OF SOCIAL NORMS (1936).
22. Not being a sociologist, I do not purport to speak for the value of the sociological work;
I limit my discussion to social psychology.
23. See SHERIF, supra note 21.
24. See Kurt Lewin, Group Decision and Social Change, in READINGS IN SOCIAL
PSYCHOLOGY 197, 197 (Eleanor E. Maccoby et al. eds., 3d ed. 1958).
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developed by the law and social norms scholars. 5
Social psychology, however, suggests several caveats to the law
and social norms scholars as well. First, people are much more active
and dynamic interpreters of their surroundings than the law and
social norms theories have argued.
One consequence of this
dynamism is that predicting how people interpret social situations is
difficult; people do not simply conform to the norm of a group
majority in all contexts. Second, subtle aspects of social situations can
induce people to behave in ways that are apparently contrary to the
social norms they espouse. Antisocial conduct is frequently not the
product of norms, but of a situation that channels people to commit
these acts. Third, social norms are always in tension with each other,
which makes predictions as to which norm will dictate social behavior
invariably unstable.
These caveats suggest that the law and social norms scholarship
needs to develop a richer theory of social influence than rationalchoice models and game theory will provide. The caveats of social
psychology also raise questions about one of the principle normative
implications of the new scholarship. If antisocial behavior is as deeply
rooted in social situations as the social psychological research
suggests, then tidying up a neighborhood might be doing more to
move crime around than reducing its overall prevalence. Although
historic "great society" programs to attack the roots of crime have
had only mixed success and have developed a bad name, they may
have had the right goal of altering the basic social situations that
inspire crime in the first place.
Furthermore, if social behavior is as difficult to predict as the
social psychological research suggests, then crime-control programs
based on signaling theories might have only marginal success in the
long run. It should not be surprising that preferences for prosocial
and antisocial conduct are as difficult to manage and predict as other
preferences. If government cannot be trusted to effectively manage
the supply of hammers and zinc (and hence markets are superior),
how can it be trusted to manage the supply of social norms? Social
psychology suggests that all such preferences and the behaviors that
accompany them are phenomenally hard to regulate.
This Essay documents the caveats that social psychological
25. The theory that law has an expressive function has not really been tested by social
psychologists. Scholars in the law and society or sociology of law fields have more direct
evidence on this point and hence they are beyond the scope of this Essay.
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research suggests for the value of social norms for policymakers. Part
I describes the newer research on social norms. Part II reviews and
interprets the original research by social psychologists on social
norms. Part III identifies the consistencies and caveats between the
law and social norms scholarship and the social psychological
scholarship with specific reference to the merits of crime-control
measures.
I.

SOCIAL NORMS AND RATIONAL CHOICE

Societies frequently manipulate the rate of pro-social and
antisocial behavior by adopting formal schedules of rewards and
punishments. People also conform to norms of behavior, even when
the costs and benefits of doing so are not readily apparent.
Consequently, societies can affect the rate of pro-social or antisocial
conduct by identifying and manipulating the operation of these
norms. In fact, in many instances, societies can have a greater
influence on conduct by altering social norms than they can by
altering the formal schedule of costs and benefits.
A.

Rational Choice and Deterrence

It is undeniably true that society can influence behavior by
altering formal costs and benefits. Punishing traffic violations with a
death sentence would doubtless deter speeding more than would a
fifty dollar fine. Likewise, providing a ten dollar rebate per
aluminum can brought to a recycling center would vastly reduce the
number of discarded cans relative to a five cent rebate. Formal
incentives clearly provide societies with a powerful means of
controlling social behavior.
In modern society, positive incentives are usually financial, and
penalties consist primarily of a mix of fines and incarceration.
Relying on formal subsidies and penalties creates several unwanted
consequences, however.
First, a penalty or subsidy might be
excessive, deterring or promoting conduct that is otherwise
desirable.26 For example, imposing a massive fine for double-parking
could deter people from parking in such a fashion in emergencies.2 7

26. See Gary S. Becker, Crime and Punishment:An Economic Approach, 76 J. POL. ECON.

169 (1968).
27. See A.
ed. 1989).

MITCHELL POLINSKY, AN INTRODUCTION TO LAW AND ECONOMICS

76-78 (2d
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Second, penalties can create perverse incentives. For example,
punishing people for killing endangered species on their property
creates incentives for landowners to ensure that no endangered
species will inhabit their property in the first place.28 Third, penalties
and subsidies are themselves expensive. For example, studies of the
social costs and benefits of imprisonment indicate that the social gains
29
from incarcerating criminals can be fleeting.
B.

Social Norms

The problems with using formal incentives to regulate behavior
suggest other mechanisms to control antisocial conduct might be
more effective. The law and social norms scholarship provides many
examples of situations in which people behave in ways that seem, at
least superficially, inconsistent with their own self-interest. 30 Even in
sterile settings designed by psychologists and behavioral economists
to be devoid of social context, people allocate rewards between
themselves and others according to equitable norms, even at their
own expense. 3'
Social norms operate somewhat independently from formal law.
Laws commonly track social norms; murder, burglary, and many
crimes are both illegal and socially inappropriate. 32 Sometimes,
however, social norms and law conflict. In such instances, norms
frequently influence behavior more than the law.3 3 For example,
Professor Ellickson has shown that community norms among
neighbors on allocating costs of stray cattle in Shasta County,
California, operate independently of the law's allocation of these
costs. 3 4 An inconsistency between law and social norms makes
enforcing formal laws against antisocial conduct difficult. 35
Absent some power to manipulate social norms, these
28. See generally Richard A. Epstein, Babbitt v. Sweet Home Chapters of Oregon: The
Law and Economics of HabitatPreservation,5 SUP. CF. ECON. REV. 1 (1997); Stephen Polasky
et al., Endangered Species Conservationon Private Land, 15 CONTEMP. ECON. POL'Y 66 (1997);
Richard L. Stroup, The Economics of Compensating Property Owners, 15 CoNTEMP. ECON.
POL'Y 55 (1997).
29. See Donohue & Siegelman, supra note 4, at 30-40.
30. See McAdams, supra note 7, at 340-41; Sunstein, supra note 10, at 904-14.
31. See Colin Camerer & Richard H. Thaler, Anomalies: Ultimatums, Dictators, and
Manners, 9 J. ECON. PERSP. 209, 216-18 (1995).
32. See McAdams, supra note 7, at 347-48.
33. See id. at 348.
34. ELLICKSON, supra note 12.
35. See McAdams, supra note 7, at 348.
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observations have only limited value for reformers. Identification of
divergences between law and norms might indicate how best to
allocate an enforcement budget, but this is a relatively weak
implication. Scholars have argued, however, that the law interacts
with social norms to influence behavior in two productive ways: First,
laws can direct or strengthen existing social norms; 36 and second,
37
social policies can change the social meaning of a behavior.
Law has an expressive function that can motivate a change in
social norms.3 8 Attaching a criminal penalty to conduct can inspire
social condemnation. Criminalizing undesirable conduct to support a
social norm can embolden people to levy informal sanctions against a
violator and signal potential violators that their conduct will draw a
severe social sanction. Ordinary citizens might begin to feel entitled
to be free from the costs of the undesirable conduct that violators
inflict on them.39 Consequently, even in the absence of enforcement,
the mere act of criminalizing conduct can reduce its prevalence. For
example, as Robert Cooter has observed, even though laws against
smoking in public are almost never enforced, compliance is
widespread. 4° Cooter suggests that labeling the behavior as a crime
will heighten potential violators' fear of social sanction, and might
41
also encourage a real increase in social sanctions against violators.
Along a similar line, laws and policies can take advantage of
social norms to change the meaning of social behaviors in ways that
discourage antisocial conduct. For example, sprucing up a rundown
community by planting flowers, fixing broken windows, and cleaning
up graffiti can change the signal that the community sends to
potential lawbreakers. 42 A neat, well-tended neighborhood conveys
the impression that its residents are willing to take other actions to
maintain a high quality of life, such as cooperating with police to
apprehend lawbreakers. Neighborhood improvement projects need
not actually increase a community's anticrime efforts, but it signals a
greater likelihood that the community will punish lawbreakers.
36. See generally Cooter, supra note 10.
37. See generally Kahan, supra note 9.
38. See generally Cooter, supra note 10.
39. See Sunstein, supra note 14, at 230-34.
40. See Cooter, supra note 10, at 594-95.
41. Id.
42. See Robert C. Ellickson, Controlling Chronic Misconduct in City Spaces: Of
Panhandlers,Skid Rows, and Public-Space Zoning, 105 YALE L.J. 1165, 1177-78 (1996); Kahan,
supra note 9, at 369-71; James Q. Wilson & George Kelling, Broken Windows, ATLANTIC,
March 1982, at 29, 29-30.
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Using the law to influence social norms raises the prospect of
having a big effect at little cost. Creating a law against smoking in
public and not enforcing it is practically a costless means of
eliminating the problem of exposure to second-hand smoke. Reforms
directed at changing social norms might also prove much more
effective and have fewer unwanted side effects than enforcing formal
penalties.
C.

Why Do Social Norms Affect Behavior?

Developing successful social policies that rely on social norms to
reduce antisocial conduct requires an understanding of how social
norms influence behavior. Without this understanding, the concept
of social norms risks becoming a set of post hoc observations about
human behavior that lacks any predictive power.43 Merely attributing
behavior that cannot easily be explained in terms of its short-term
costs and benefits to some underlying norm is not helpful. The real
value of social norms for legal scholarship lies in identifying social
reforms that can be identified ex ante as having the ability to reduce
antisocial conduct.
Legal scholars have produced several different theories to
explain the influence of social norms. First, group membership is
often so valuable that the threat of expulsion might have a big effect
on behavior. In the case of customary practices in industry groups,
for example, compliance with the industry practices often requires
that members forego strategic advantages that they might otherwise
gain over others in exchange for continued membership in the
Because continued access to the benefits of group
group. 4
membership vastly outweighs the short-term benefits of violating the
group's customs, the group members tend to conform. This account
of social norms is really an extension of the idea that incentives
matter. It simply incorporates the rewards and sanctions that
accompany membership in a cooperative group into the analysis.
As a related theory, some scholars have suggested that
acceptance by others is such an important source of self-esteem for
most people that groups of people have an inherent ability to
influence behavior. 45 Humans are social animals, and acceptance by
others is itself important, whether or not this acceptance leads
43. See McAdams, supra note 7, at 341; Sunstein, supra note 10, at 945.
44. See Bernstein, supra note 9, at 134-35.
45. See McAdams, supra note 7.
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directly to other rewards. Individuals might therefore be willing to
engage in conduct that benefits a group at their own expense, purely
to attain or to maintain the social contact and acceptance that
accompanies group membership.
This theory is also perfectly
consistent with the incentives theory, but it recognizes social approval
as an intrinsically important reward.
Legal scholars have also recognized that group membership
provides significant information to others. 46 Because small, seemingly
insignificant behaviors can signal membership in a group, people
might engage in such behaviors purely to signal others that they
belong to a certain group, or subscribe to a certain set of beliefs. 47 For
example, voting is often identified as a behavior that is difficult to
explain in terms of costs and benefits, but can be explained in terms
of signaling. 48 By itself, voting is unlikely to be of much value to the
voter. The act of voting, however, signals to neighbors and friends
that one is a public-spirited member of the community. People
conform their behavior to the standards of a group to signal their
membership in that group and thereby achieve any benefits that such
membership conveys.
The theory that cleaning up a neighborhood deters crime takes
advantage of these principles. Cleaning up trash and fixing broken
windows is an effort to signal to potential lawbreakers that the
community does not tolerate crime.
This theory is obviously
attractive to policymakers seeking to reduce antisocial conduct. The
theory suggests cheap and effective mechanisms to reduce antisocial
conduct. 49 Although hiring someone to collect trash and erase graffiti
is not free, it is apt to be much less expensive than either widespread
incarceration or massive antipoverty efforts.
The law and social norms scholarship thus presents an intriguing
new direction for crime control.
Neither incarceration nor
antipoverty programs addresses social norms, and hence miss an
opportunity to implement low-cost mechanisms to reduce crime.

46. See, e.g., Eric Posner, supra note 10.
47. See id.
48. See generally Richard L. Hasen, Voting Without Law?, 144 U. PA. L. REv. 2135 (1996).
But see George A. Quattrone & Amos Tversky, Causal Versus Diagnostic Contingencies: On
Self-Deception and the Voter's Illusion, 46 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 237, 244-47
(1984) (providing an explanation of voting based on cognitive biases).
49. See Kahan supra note 9; Meares & Kahan, supra note 1.
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II. SOCIAL INFLUENCE, SOCIAL MEANING, AND SOCIAL
PSYCHOLOGY

Social psychologists have long been interested both in social
policies aimed at reducing crime and in social norms. Like the law
and social norms scholars, they have criticized incarceration as
ineffective and brutal and have criticized elaborate antipoverty
programs. Yet, social psychologists have not generally endorsed
social norms as a primary means of crime control. The reason may be
that social psychological research identifies both the power and limits
of social norms. Norms dominate human social behavior, but social
psychological research demonstrates that their influence can be
ephemeral and hard to predict. In short, research both supports the
law and social norms scholarship and counsels caution in the
application of its teachings. A review of the social psychological
research reveals much support for the law and social norms
scholarship. It also provides the basis for social psychologist's
caution.
A.

Social PsychologicalSupport for Social Norms Theory

Groups exert a powerful influence on individual behavior.
Groups of people spontaneously form social norms, with which their
members conform. Group norms can also affect people's perceptions
and beliefs. Even without a shared norm, the behavior of similar
others has a profound effect on what people do and how they think
because it provides an important source of information on how to
interpret social situations. These observations support the law and
social norms signaling theories. These observations also have support
from social psychological research, beginning with the field's earliest
experiments.
1. The Influence of Group Norms on Perception: Sherif's
Autokinetic Effect
The influence of others can influence how people see the world,
even to the point of affecting basic human perception. Nearly seventy
years ago, psychologist Muzafir Sherif argued that people naturally
adhere to norms, even when judging mundane perceptual stimuli.5 0
To demonstrate this, Sherif documented what he referred to as the
50.

SHERIF, supra note

21, at 89-112.
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"autokinetic effect." In his study, Sherif asked people to stare at a
point of light in an otherwise completely darkened room. Sherif
informed his subjects that under these circumstances, most people
perceive that the light has moved, even though it remains stationary.
Sherif asked the subjects to identify how far the light seemed to move
during a two-second interval, and then repeated the exposure several
times. Subjects viewed the stimuli either first alone and then in
groups of two or three, or in groups of two or three first and then
alone. In all cases, the subjects announced their estimates verbally.
Sherif hypothesized that on their own, people would develop internal
norms to guide them in deciding how far the light moved, and that
their answers would remain within this internally set range. Sherif
also reasoned that a group would create its own norm, to which
individuals would then conform.
Social norms clearly developed in Sherif's study.
When
responding in a group, subjects' responses coalesced into a much
narrower range than when subjects responded alone. Subjects who
responded first in groups quickly adapted to the group norm, and
generally retained this norm when they began responding alone.
Subjects who first responded alone also adjusted their own responses
to conform to an emerging group norm. The results of Sherif's
experiment show that even in a minimally social setting, groups create
a social norm, the influence of which persists even in the group's
absence.
Psychologists have long used the power of group norms to induce
pro-social behavior. For example, during World War II, psychologist
Kurt Lewin used social influence techniques to encourage people to
eat more organ meats, so as to reduce demand for meat.5 Lewin
organized groups of women who were responsible for meal decisions
in their homes to meet together and discuss the importance of
frugality in wartime. When Lewin induced each member of these
groups to make a public commitment to using organ meats in at least
one meal per week, he found much greater compliance with the
request than when he did not insist on a public commitment. Public
commitment to this social norm overcame resistance to the
underlying request.
The studies conducted by Lewin and Sherif revealed how
powerful group norms can be. Sherif showed both that norms of
behavior develop quickly and easily, and that these norms affect
51. Lewin, supra note 24.
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behavior even after the group would seem to have no influence.
Groups have an unspoken ability to control their members. Lewin's
work showed that inducing public commitment to adhere to a group's
norms increases the power of these norms even further.
These studies support the idea that group norms can provide
effective control over antisocial conduct. In fact, numerous self-help
and self-improvement groups have taken advantage of the power of
group influences to help people control their behavior. 52 Studies like
those of Lewin and Sherif demonstrate that social norms merit the
kind of attention that the new law and social norms scholars believe
that they do.
2. The Power of Social Models: Social Cognitive Modeling
In fact, social psychological research suggests that the law and
social norms scholars do not go far enough. People's behavior has a
profound influence on those around them, even when it does not
convey information about a social norm. The tenet that observing
another person, especially someone similar, engaging in a behavior
makes someone more likely to engage in the same behavior is
practically a law of social psychology.53 As one example, cited by law
and social norms scholar Professor Kahan as empirical support for the
power of social influence, 54 psychologist Philip Zimbardo induced
people to destroy an automobile by providing a model who began to
smash it with a sledgehammer.55 Passersby destroyed a similar
automobile placed in a neighborhood in New York City even without
a similar model, arguably because people in this neighborhood had
(unfortunately) witnessed many examples of such activities.5 6
As Professor Kahan noted, Professor Zimbardo's study is
impressionistic, rather than scientific.57 But it is just the tip of an
iceberg of studies on the power of social models. Psychologist Albert
Bandura conducted numerous systematic studies of the power of

52. See LEE Ross & RICHARD E. NISBETr, THE PERSON AND THE SITUATION:
PERSPECIVES OF SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 222 (1991).
53. See ALBERT BANDURA, SOCIAL FOUNDATIONS OF THOUGHT AND ACTION: A
SOCIAL COGNITIVE THEORY 47-48 (1986).
54. Kahan, supra note 6, at 355-56.
55. Phillip G. Zimbardo, The Human Choice: Individuation, Reason, and Order Versus
Deindividuation,Impulse, and Chaos, in NEBRASKA SYMPOSIUM ON MOTIVATION 1969, at 237,
287-93 (William J. Arnold & David Levie eds., 1969).
56. See id.
57. Kahan, supra note 6, at 355-56.
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social modeling on the level of aggression in children. 8 For instance,
he demonstrated that exposing children to examples of aggressive
behavior increased the level of aggression they exhibited. 9 In one of
his studies, children punched a "bobo doll" (an inflatable clown
weighted heavily on the bottom so that it always pops back up when
knocked around) more often and more aggressively after watching a
video of another child engaging in a violent exchange with the doll
than after watching a child engaging in more passive play. 6°
According to Bandura, social modeling influences behavior in
two ways, both of which are basically consistent with the theories
advanced by the social norms scholars in law. First, watching
someone else engage in a certain behavior suggests that the behavior
is acceptable under the circumstances. 61 The fact that some other
child has endlessly pummeled a bobo doll without suffering adverse
consequences suggests to the child watching that he or she can also do
so without penalty. This account supports the law and social norms
theorists; watching someone else engage in a behavior without
penalty identifies a social norm that the behavior will not be
punished.
The second theory that Professor Bandura advances to explain
the influence of social modeling suggests that social models are even
more important determinants of behavior.
Professor Bandura
advances a social cognitive explanation for the power of modeling. 62
He argues that seeing a similar person engage in a behavior leads the
observer to believe that they have the ability to engage in the same
conduct. Social models show an observer what is possible, thereby
changing what the observer believes is possible for someone like them
to accomplish (even if the behavior is as simple as bashing a bobo
doll). Observing similar others engage in conduct imbues people with
a sense of personal (or self) "efficacy" concerning that conduct. 63
Although self-efficacy is invaluable when it consists of a belief that
one can pass an exam or drive a car, it also can produce a belief that
one can rob a bank or blow up a building. 61

58.
(1973).
59.
60.
61.
62.
63.
64.

See generally ALBERT BANDURA,

AGGRESSION: A SOCIAL LEARNING ANALYSIS

See id.
See id. at 72-85.
See id. at 85.
Id.
See BANDURA, supra note 58, at 399-400.
See id. at 431-33.
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The social cognitive influence of social models and importance of
self-efficacy indicates that groups have even greater power than law
and social norms scholars have heretofore identified. The social
information explanation implies that the power of social modeling is
ephemeral and subject to manipulation. All that one would need to
change an individual's behavior is to change the models. The selfefficacy explanation, however, indicates that social models are more
insidious. Once someone gets a sense of personal efficacy as to a
behavior, it is difficult to change their beliefs. Imbuing someone with
the belief that they can successfully rob houses, for example, will not
change just because a community starts to clean up trash and fix
broken windows. Likewise, a person who quits selling drugs and
obtains legal employment can inspire a more beneficial sense of
efficacy in those who observe this behavior.
Social models do not merely signal different norms, they affect
how people view themselves and the possibilities in their lives. Thus,
Professor Bandura's work indicates that social models have such
lasting effects on behavior that simple manipulations of apparent
norms might not really provide cheap, inexpensive solutions to
antisocial conduct. Anticrime programs also have to worry about the
kinds of models that a neighborhood provides.
3.

Social Information Theories: Asch's Conformity Studies

As the social cognitive theory of social modeling suggests, the
influence of groups might be extremely difficult to manipulate.
Fortunately, groups need not change people's perceptions or beliefs
to change their behavior. The behavior of others can alter the
meaning of social situations and dramatically affect their behavior,
just as the law and social norms scholars predict.
Consider a well-known study conducted by psychologist
Solomon Asch in the early 1950s.65 In the basic design for his study,
Asch asked subjects to participate in a group experiment on visual
perception, ostensibly with seven other subjects. 66 Only one of the
subjects was a novice to the experiment, however, the other seven
were actually Asch's confederates. The real subject was always
seated with six subjects on his left and one on his right. 67 The
65. See Solomon E. Asch, Opinions and Social Pressure,SCI. AM., Nov. 1955, at 31,31-35.
66. See id. at 32.
67. Although Asch only used male subjects, others replicated his results with female
subjects. See Richard A. Crutchfield, Conformity and Character, 10 AM. PSYCHOL. 191, 196
(1955).
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experimenter then informed the entire group that their task was to
compare a target line to three lines of various lengths and determine
which of the three choices was the same length as the target. 68 The
experimenter informed the subjects that he would show them a series
of similar targets and choices, but the task was always to identify the
line of the same length as the target. The experimenter always
instructed the subjects to vocalize their answers in order such that the
real subject responded only after six of the confederates had already
responded.
Asch's study began innocently enough with the first target; the
answer seemed obvious, as the line lengths were quite disparate and
all six subjects identified the line that seemed appropriate. As the
experiment progressed, however, despite the fact that the right
answer always seemed obvious, the confederates sometimes
uniformly provided an obviously wrong answer with the same
confidence and assurance as in previous rounds when they had
provided the correct answer. The subjects in Asch's study found this
behavior baffling. From their perspective, subjects in the same
position as they were in clearly gave uniformly inaccurate responses,
despite the ease of the task. In the face of this uniformity, subjects
gave responses that conformed to the inaccurate response of the
group on roughly one-third of the trials. 69 Most of the subjects
(roughly eighty percent) gave responses that conformed to the
group's inaccurate responses on at least one trial during the
experiment.70
Asch's study could be said to demonstrate the overwhelming
power of a group to create and enforce a social norm, thereby
replicating Sherif's work. Even though the group consisted of
complete strangers with no real power to sanction the subject, the
subjects conformed to the group norm. Asch's work, however,
illustrates a somewhat different point. The group did not influence
the subjects' visual perception. Indeed, the very reason Asch used
such obvious stimuli was to demonstrate that a group could change
behavior without changing perception.71 Neither were Asch's subjects
merely bowing to the pressure of a group.72 Rather, the group's
6& See Asch, supra note 65, at 32-33.
69. See id.
70. See id. at 33.
71. See id. at 32-33.
72. See Morton Deutsch & Harold B. Gerard, A Study of Normative and Informational
Social Influences upon Individual Judgment, 51 J. ABNORMAL & SOC. PSYCHOL. 629, 632 (1955)
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inaccurate responses forced the subjects to reexamine their beliefs
about the task. Subjects who conformed to the group's inaccurate
responses did so because they ultimately determined that they might
have misunderstood the task in some way.73 The group did not alter
the subject's judgment of the stimulus materials, but it did alter the
target of their judgment.14 Asch's study shows that groups can
influence people's behavior without even changing their beliefs or
norms.75
Two pieces of evidence confirm this interpretation of Asch's
study. First, Asch conducted a version of the study in which one of
the six confederates who responded before the subject always gave
the objectively correct answers.76 In these instances, subjects rarely
conformed to the majority of the group.7 7 In effect, the subjects

disregarded the norm adopted by five of the six members of the group
in favor of the minority. The single defector provided adequate
assurance to the subject that they had correctly understood the task.
Second, later replications of the Asch experiment showed that when
subjects had an explanation for the group's anomalous responses
subjects did not conform to the group norm. 78 When the subjects
came to believe that they had misunderstood the question, they
conformed to the group; when they encountered either some support
for their own views or another explanation for the group's behavior,
the group's conduct had no effect on their own behavior.7 9
Asch's conformity experiments provide the best support for the
law and social norms scholar's policy prescription on cleaning up
neighborhoods as a way of reducing crime. Committing crime means
something different in a clean neighborhood than in a dirty one.
Even someone who does not subscribe to social norms against
lawbreaking might reevaluate their behavior in a well-tended area.
Improving a neighborhood's appearance need not affect a potential
lawbreaker's judgment about the morality of committing crime in
(showing that even when subjects in Asch's paradigm responded anonymously, the group norm
still influenced their responses).
73. See ROSS & NISBETT, supra note 52, at 34-35.
74. See id.
75. See generally Asch, supra note 65.
76. See id. at 34.
77. See id.
78. See Lee Ross et al., The Role of Attribution Processes in Conformity and Dissent: ReVisiting the Asch Situation, 31 AM. PSYCHOL. 148, 150 (1977). The subjects were told that the
confederates were operating under an unusual payment schedule that might have rewarded
them for what seemed like inaccurate answers.
79. See Ross & NISBETr, supra note 52, at 34-35.
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order to reduce crime; it need only change their judgment about the
community's likely response to their behavior.
4.

More Social Information Research: The Murder of Kitty
Genovese Explained

Psychologists have demonstrated the power of social influence to
affect adherence to social norms in real-world settings as well. In
particular, a series of studies by psychologists Bibb Latand and John
Darley and others demonstrated that groups have a profound effect
on the pro-social behavior of coming to the aid of a stranger. 80 Their
research was motivated by the shocking murder of Kitty Genovese in
New York City. Ms. Genovese was murdered in an alley in New
York while some thirty-six neighbors apparently watched from their
apartment windows without so much as calling the police to help her.
The case provoked outrage and led many to question the morals of
New Yorkers.
The popular press argued that the incident
demonstrated that New York City residents had developed a selfish
81
social norm of refusing to aid their neighbors.
To use the language of the law and social norms theorists, Latan6
and Darley challenged the theory that New Yorkers had abandoned
the norm of coming to the aid of strangers in need, and argued
instead for a social influence interpretation. Latan6 and Darley
reasoned that when faced with a mildly ambiguous situation, such as
unidentified screams from an alley outside one's window, people look
to others to help them interpret the situation.82 Unfortunately, what
they often see is other people looking to them for help interpreting
the situation, rather than aiding the victim. This leads the bystanders
to believe that the victim does not actually need assistance, or, if they
do, the other bystanders must already have called for it. It is not that
the bystanders subscribe to a social norm of not helping, it is that they
unwittingly influence each other's interpretation of the situation.
Latan6 and Darley and others conducted several empirical
demonstrations of this phenomenon by simulating slightly ambiguous
emergency situations. 83 In one such demonstration, they arranged for
subjects to sit in a room completing a questionnaire while the room
80. See generally BIBB LATANfn & JOHN M. DARLEY, THE UNRESPONSIVE BYSTANDER:
WHY DOESN'T HE HELP? (1970).

81. See id. at 1-3.
82. See generally Bibb Latand & John M. Darley, Group Inhibition of Bystander
Intervention in Emergencies, 10 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 215 (1968).
83. These are described in Latan6 & Darley, supra note 80.
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slowly began filling with smoke.84 The subjects encountered this
manufactured emergency either alone, with two confederates who sat
passively as the room filled with smoke, or with two other naive
subjects. When alone, seventy-five percent of the subjects called for
help within the time allotted for the experiment. When the subject
was with two confederates who calmly continued to fill out the
questionnaire as the smoke entered the room, only ten percent called
for help. This result is striking, by the end of the experiment, the
smoke had become so thick that it was difficult to see across the small
room!85 Of the groups of three naive subjects, only thirty-eight
percent reported a problem to anyone. 6 The presence of others
inhibited a pro-social response.
Latan6 and his colleagues replicated this result with more
realistic stimuli. 87
In one study, they arranged for a female
experimenter to lead male subjects into a room to be left either alone,
with a male confederate, or with another naive male subject in a room
connected to an adjacent room by an intercom system, ostensibly to
complete a questionnaire. 88 After the experimenter left the room, she
entered an adjacent room and, unknown to the subjects, turned on a
tape recording of a staged accident. The recording contained sounds
of the experimenter falling, complaining loudly about her ankle, and
indicating that she was unable to move. The tape then continued with
her moaning loudly for another minute. When alone, seventy-six
percent of the subjects got help, or tried to determine what had
happened, and the remaining twenty-four percent called out loudly to
see if the experimenter needed assistance. When paired with a
confederate who did not respond, only seven percent of the subjects
reacted at all, and a majority of the pairs of naive subjects failed to
respond. In later studies, Darley and his colleagues replicated these
results with a staged epileptic fit.89 Finally, these researchers also
showed that people who witness a crime (theft of a case of beer from
84. See generally Latan6 & Darley, supra note 82, at 215-18.
85. The result also raises some suspicion as to how ludicrous the behavior of the
confederates must have seemed to the subjects, as the confederates were instructed not to
acknowledge the presence of smoke in any way. See id.
86. See id. at 218. Because the base rate of reporting the problem was 75% per individual,
98% of the groups of three should have included at least one subject who would have reported
the problem.
87. See Bibb Latand & Judith Rodin, A Lady in Distress: Inhibiting Effects of Friends and
Strangers on Bystander Intervention, 5 J. EXPERIMENTAL PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 189,
189-93 (1969).
88. See id. at 192-93.
89. See LATANP & DARLEY, supra note 80, at 93-112.
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a liquor store that occurred when a clerk was distracted) in the
presence of others are far less likely to report the incident than when
they are alone. 90
In none of these studies can it really be said that the presence of
others altered people's social norms about helping those in need.
Neither was Kitty Genovese really the victim of a callous, urban
social norm. Rather, the presence of a passive group affected the
bystander's interpretation of Genovese's plight.
The studies Latan6 and Darley conducted on bystander
intervention reveal the importance of social signals in realistic
settings. The results support the hypothesis that tidy neighborhoods
can effectively signal whether a behavior will be tolerated, even if
they do not alter beliefs about the appropriateness of committing
antisocial acts. These experiments support the basic tenets of the law
and social norms theorists. They show that norms develop quickly,
and, if anything, have more power to influence behavior than the law
and social norms scholarship indicates. This work suggests, in fact,
that the power of norms derives not from implicit schedules of costs
and benefits that groups bring, but from the power to influence
perception and interpretation of a situation and even of oneself.
B.

Limitations of Social Norms Theories

The control that social norms exert on behavior is powerful, but
phenomenally subtle. In some circumstances, people adhere so
closely to a social norm that it seems unshakable. In others, however,
social norms appear completely irrelevant. The latter point is best
illustrated by social psychological studies in which the experimenters
induce antisocial behavior that departs from significant social norms.
Social psychologists have proven time and time again that, important
though they may be, social norms do not completely dictate human
behavior. Similarly, the prevalence of pro-social behavior depends
upon seemingly unimportant social contexts.
1.

Milgram's Obedience Experiments

Psychologist Stanley Milgram conducted the most compelling
demonstration that people will behave in ways contrary to their

90. See id. at 74-77. When alone, 65% of the witnesses reported the theft, while only in
56% of the two-person groups did even one of the witnesses report the theft. See id. at 76.
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norms.9' Milgram's work demonstrated that ordinary individuals can
be induced to brutalize others, against all norms of civilized conduct.
Furthermore, Milgram induced antisocial conduct without changing
the social meaning of the violent conduct; his subjects knew that what
they were doing was wrong, and they did it anyway. Consequently,
Milgram's study challenges social norms theories of any kind.
Milgram conducted several versions of his study, but the most
basic design went as follows. 92 The subjects consisted of ordinary
residents of New Haven, Connecticut, who responded to a newspaper
advertisement seeking subjects for a psychology experiment. Upon
their arrival to Milgram's lab at Yale University, the subjects met two
other individuals, one wearing a white lab coat introduced as the
experimenter, and the other introduced as another subject. The other
subject was, in fact, a confederate of the experimenter. The
experimenter described the study as one that concerned the effects of
aversive stimuli on learning and stated that he needed one of the two
subjects to be the "teacher" and one to be the "learner." 93 The
experimenter then conducted a rigged drawing that always assigned
the role of teacher to the actual subject and the role of learner to the
confederate.
With the roles assigned, the experimenter explained the
responsibilities of the teacher and learner. The learner proceeded to
an adjacent room where the experimenter strapped him into a chair
and connected him to wires capable of administering electric shocks.
The teacher and experimenter would remain in a control room, and
the learner would remain in an adjacent room. Contact was
facilitated by an intercom system only. Ostensibly, the learner's task
was to memorize a set of word pairs and to attempt to provide the
correct responses. The experimenter explained to the teacher that his
role would be to read the cue words, score the learner's response, and
deliver an aversive stimulus to the learner for an inaccurate response.
The aversive stimuli consisted of electric shocks administered through
a control panel. The teacher was to change the setting of the shocks
and press a button that triggered the shocks. The control panel made
thirty shock settings available, labeled as ranging from 15 to 450 volts
(in increments of 15 volts). Ranges of the shock settings were also
labeled, from weak to strong as "slight shock, moderate shock, strong
91. See generally STANLEY MILGRAM, OBEDIENCE TO AUTHORITY (1974).

92. See id. at 13-26.
93. See id. at 18.
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shock, very strong shock, intense shock, extreme intensity shock,
danger: severe shock." 94 The highest two levels were labeled "XXX."
The experimenter explained to the teacher that he was to increase the
shock intensity by one level with each incorrect response. 95 The
experimenter also administered a forty-five volt shock to the teacher
as a sample.
The experiment began simply enough, with the learner scoring
reasonably well, but with some inaccuracy. 96 This required the
teacher to begin administering successively greater shocks to the
learner. The learner also began to express escalating levels of
discomfort with the shocks. At 75-105 volts, the learner grunted at
each shock; at 120 volts, the learner verbally protested that the shocks
were painful; at 150 volts, the learner shouted at the experimenter,
complaining that he could not proceed; at 180 volts the learner
shouted, " I can't stand the pain. '97 The progression up to 270 volts
produced nothing but errors and demands to be let loose. At 270
volts the learner began screaming in agony with each shock. At 300
volts he announced that he would refuse to cooperate with the
experiment further, which he repeated at 315 volts. At 330 volts the
learner screamed a last time and was not heard from thereafter.
As the shocks began to increase, the subjects frequently
protested to the experimenter. Milgram had devised a simple series
of scripted responses for the experimenter to encourage the subjects
to continue administering shocks.98 If the subject turned to the
experimenter for advice or in protest, the experimenter was to give
four responses in the following order: "please continue"; "the
experiment requires that you continue"; "it is absolutely essential that
you continue"; "you have no other choice, you must go on." 99 If the
subject asked about harm to the learner, the experimenter responded,
"Although the shocks may be painful, there is no permanent tissue
damage, so please go on." 1° If the subject argued that the learner had
refused to continue, the experimenter responded by saying, "Whether
the learner likes it or not, you must go on until he has learned all the

94.
95.
96.
97.
98.
99.
100.

Id.
See id. at 20-21.
See id. at 21-23.
Id. at 23.
See id. at 21-23.
Id.
Id. at 21.
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word pairs correctly."'01 1 Other than these prompts, the experimenter
made no demands of the subject.
It is difficult to convey the drama of Milgram's experiment on
paper; only Milgram's film of the subjects truly does the situation
justice. The 1960s intercom system mutes the screams somewhat, but
they are nonetheless chilling. The behavior of the subjects is
testament enough. The subjects protest, wring their hands, laugh
nervously, cry, and become angry at both the experimenter and the
learner. 1°2 Most of them also continued to administer painful electric
shocks. In the version of the study described, no subject stopped
administering shocks at less than 135 volts, and eighty percent
administered shocks past 285 volts-well after the subject had asked
to be let out of the experiment and begun screaming in pain.1°3 A
surprising 62.5% administered all of the shocks all the way to 450
volts, several minutes after the learner had screamed in agony one
last time and then ceased responding. 1°4
Why were so many people willing to inflict brutal punishment on
an innocent individual? It was not merely because Milgram had
introduced a competing norm, as is often said of Milgram's study.
There surely is a general norm of obeying authority in American
society, but not to such a degree that people are willing to torture
another because someone in a lab coat requests it. Authority matters,
and Milgram found that people complied less when he conducted the
experiment in a rundown section of New Haven, ostensibly on behalf
of a fictitious organization named "Research Associates of
Bridgeport."' 105 Even in this setting, however, forty-eight percent of
the subjects completed the experiment by administering all of the
available shocks. 1°6
Neither can one say that Milgram had set up his situation so as to
change the social meaning of the subject's behavior. Torturing an
innocent research subject is unambiguously immoral, and the subjects
knew that their conduct was immoral. Their anxiety, protests,
nervous laughter, and tears all attest to the fact that they believed that
what they were doing was wrong. Many subjects repeatedly asserted
that the study was immoral, even as they continued to deliver
101.
102.
103.
104.
105.
106.

Id. at 22.
See id. at 44-54.
See id. at 35.
See id.
See id. at 68.
See id. at 69.
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shocks. 1°7 Also, in a version of the experiment in which the subjects
were given the option of setting their own shock levels, they chose
only the very lowest available, thereby revealing what ordinary
people believe to be the appropriate behavior.tt s
So, why did Milgram's subjects comply with the experimenter?
Many facets of the experiment conspired to produce the result
Milgram obtained, but there are two basic forces at work. First, the
subjects were victims of a seductive social script that Milgram created
to keep subjects in the experiment. When subjects requested that
they be allowed to stop, Milgram's experimenter calmly insisted that
the experiment required that they continue. Normally, a request to
be let out of a situation would be honored, but Milgram had
instructed the experimenter to respond passively and insist that the
When subjects
teacher continue administering electric shocks.
offered to return the four dollars and fifty cents that they were paid to
participate, the experimenter simply reminded them that they had
earned the money just for showing up and that it was theirs to keep
no matter what. When the subjects expressed concern for the wellbeing of the subject, the experimenter merely reassured the subject
that the shocks could cause "no permanent tissue damage." 1°9
Milgram had closed the normal mechanisms of social interaction. To
end the experiment, the subjects had to confront authority, but more
importantly, they had to break out of the script that Milgram had
arranged. They had to insist to the experimenter that he was wrong,
that they did in fact have a choice, and that continuing was so
inappropriate that their morality prevented them from continuing.
Indeed, the subjects who refused to continue frequently apologized
for being unable to go on, as if they felt they had wronged the
experimenter in some way.110
Second, the subjects in Milgram's experiment had difficulty
justifying their behavior to themselves. Milgram had made it easy for
them to administer the first shock to the learner. The study seemed
innocent enough, the task appeared easy, and the initial shocks were
less painful than the sample shock that the subject had experienced.
Once a subject administered the first shock, he or she was stuck. In
order to stop administering shocks at any level, the subjects had to

107.
108.
109.
110.

See id. at 48-49.
See id. at 70-72.
Id. at 21-23.
See id. at 45-88.
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justify their apparently immoral behavior up to that point. In fact, in
all versions of Milgram's study, the subjects who stopped the
experiment desisted at a point in which the condition of the learner
had changed abruptly, such as when the learner screamed in agony,
asserted that he did not want to be in the study anymore, or ceased
responding altogether.
There is no doubt that social norms played a role in Milgram's
study. Milgram's script for the experimenter takes advantage of
people's reliance on social norms. The typical requests to be let out
of the experiment that the subjects made all consisted of appeals to
social norms that the subjects clearly expected would be honored.
When they were not, the subject was left with no conventional means
to refuse the experimenter. Part of the reason the subjects remained
in the experiment is that providing a reason for refusing a request
from someone in the position of the experimenter is itself a social
norm."' The other key reason for continued obedience is that the
subjects wanted to believe that they were good, decent people, but if
administering shocks was immoral, they had no way to justify the
harm that they had already inflicted. Milgram's study could be said to
have inverted the ordinary norms of social behavior to produce
sadistic behavior in ordinary individuals.
Milgram's study, however, reveals the power of situations to
control behavior more than the power of social norms. The design of
the experiment induced ordinary people to violate their social norms,
and even break the law. Once the learner withdrew his consent to
participate in the study, the subjects were committing a battery
without experiencing any form of duress that the law would recognize
as a sufficient defense. Continuing to administer the shocks also
violates a profoundly important social norm of not harming an
innocent person. The study suggests that even if social norms play an
important role in social order, they can also produce undesirable
conduct.
Milgram's study indicates that espousing a pro-social set of
norms may not be adequate to keep people from engaging in
destructive conduct. Undesirable behaviors might often be produced
by a complicated set of social circumstances that strongly resist
change. If Milgram's study has general application, then crime might
well be the product of people who face an unfortunate array of
choices and opportunities in which law-abiding behavior does seem
111. See ELLEN J. LANGER, MINDFULNESS 14-15 (1989).
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like a real option. Milgram's study suggests that antisocial conduct is
the result of situations and not of an unfortunate set of norms. Thus,
the results support the goals of a classic social liberal agenda of
attacking poverty and developing opportunities for honest work,
rather than working to change social norms.
2.

The Ephemeral Influence of Norms: On the Road from
Jerusalem to Jericho

Subtle social factors can influence whether or not people
conform to a pro-social norm as well. Innocuous background
circumstances of a situation can dictate whether or not people will
conform to a pro-social norm, thereby suggesting that social norms
are less important determinants of behavior than more mundane
aspects of social situations.
A study conducted by psychologists Darley and Batson illustrates
this point most clearly." 2
The subjects of this study were
undergraduate divinity students at Princeton University.
Upon
arrival to the experiment room, the subjects were told that the study
concerned the ability of divinity students to think quickly, on their
feet as it were, in preparation for a public speaking engagement. The
experimenters told the subjects that they would have to walk over to
another building and give a talk to a group of freshman divinity
students. Half of the subjects were told to address employment
opportunities for divinity students after graduation, and the others
were told to discuss the parable of the good Samaritan. This
manipulation was crossed with another variable that proved criticalthe subjects were told either that they were already late for the talk
and had to hurry, that they had just enough time to get to the talk, or
that they had a few extra minutes.
Darley and Batson's experiment truly begins during the subjects'
walk over to the building to deliver their talk. All subjects passed a
man who was slumped over against a wall, apparently in need of
assistance.
The man was, in reality, a confederate of the
experimenters. As the subjects passed the confederate, he coughed
twice and groaned. If the subjects asked him if he needed help, he
said no, but it appeared otherwise. The subject of the sermon had no

112. See generally John M. Darley & C. Daniel Batson, "From Jerusalem to Jericho": A
Study of Situational and Dispositional Variables in Helping Behavior, 27 J. PERSONALITY &
SOC. PSYCHOL. 100 (1973).
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effect on the rate of helping." 3 Whether the experimenter instructed
the subjects to hurry or not, however, mattered a great deal. Subjects
in a hurry were far less likely to stop and provide assistance than the
other subjects.
The results of the study are a stunning triumph of mundane
features of a situation over social norms. The subjects were, after all,
not a random sample of Princeton undergraduates who might lack a
dedication to the social norm of helping those in need-they were
divinity students. The beliefs that these students doubtless held dear,
however, were easily manipulated from an instruction by an unknown
experimenter to hurry. Furthermore, even making the parable of the
good Samaritan salient had no real effect on the subjects relative to
the instruction to hurry. A pro-social norm, it seems, has the most
effect when acting on the norm is convenient.
The results of Darley and Batson's study can be interpreted as
consistent with social norms theories, and even with rational choice
theories. Social norms theorists could argue that the experimenters
invoked competing norms of fulfilling a commitment to the
experimenter to not only give the talk, but to hurry over to the
audience to do so. Similarly, rational choice theorists could argue
that the experimenters increased the cost of tarrying for any reason.
Both accounts are reasonable, but miss the important message of the
study. The rational choice story clearly fails to give an indication of
why the request to hurry increased the cost of helping to such an
extent that the students were willing to abandon closely held beliefs.
Similarly, arguing that the experimenters have introduced a
competing social norm raises the question as to why one of the norms
is so much more important than the other, and how anyone
attempting to manipulate social norms to produce a certain behavior
would be able to predict in advance which norm would have the most
impact on behavior.
One of the key lessons of Darley and Batson's study for social
norms theories of crime control, and also the chief lesson of
Milgram's study, is the notion of norms in tension. Given the results
of these studies, social norms, even ostensibly pro-social ones, can be
twisted to produce antisocial behavior.

113. Nor did a personality variable assessed by the experimenters, which was whether the
subject was an intellectually-oriented divinity student or a spiritually-oriented student. See id. at
106. This latter variable, however, did influence the type of help that the subjects provided. See
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III. LESSONS FOR LAW: CONCLUSIONS

The decades of research in social psychology, as illustrated in the
studies described in this Essay and in others, distill into three basic
lessons. 114 First, people actively interpret the social circumstances in
which they find themselves, making subjective reality as important a
determinant of behavior as objective reality. In Asch's study, the
objective reality of the line lengths did not dissuade subjects from
conforming to the group norm as they struggled to make sense of this
odd situation.
Second, situations often overwhelm individual
personalities and preferences and norms. Milgram showed that
certain situations can overwhelm ordinary individuals, inducing them
to engage in monstrous behaviors. Third, in most circumstances,
multiple social forces push social behavior in opposite directions.
Subjects in Darley and Batson's study believed deeply in the
importance of helping others, but most ignored this belief in an effort
to comply with a request to hurry.
These basic lessons support the new law and social norms
scholarship in many respects. The idea that group norms are
powerful and important determinants of behavior pervades the social
psychological literature. Sherif demonstrated that norms develop
naturally, that people adhere to them even without apparent sanction,
and that norms might even alter perception. Lewin showed how to
use the influence of norms to induce pro-social behavior. Even the
demonstrations of unusual behavior that Asch and Milgram produced
take advantage of social norms. Clearly, even though they are
sometimes inconsistent with each other, social norms are a powerful
influence on social behavior. Hence, understanding social norms is a
key to understanding social behavior.
Similarly, the theory that others' conduct can alter the social
meaning of behavior has ample support from social psychology. The
basic concept of active, subjective interpretation of social settings is
somewhat similar to the theories of social influence and social
meaning that the law and social norms theorists have described.
Asch's study shows that a group can induce people to reinterpret a
social situation, just as a neighborhood can induce a potential
lawbreaker to decide that committing a crime would be inadvisable
there. Likewise, the passive responses of the bystanders in Latan6
114. The idea that these three basic lessons are the principle morals of the social

psychological story comes directly from Ross & NISBETIr, supra note 52, at 8-17.
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and Darley's studies show that people use the behavior of others to
help them interpret social situations. In addition to the support for
law and social norms theories, each of social psychology's three basic
lessons suggests caveats to the new literature on social norms.
A.

Social Influence Reexamined

Even though the law and social norms scholarship recognizes the
importance of subjective social interpretations, its theories probably
would not have predicted several of the results in the literature. For
example, although the law and social norms theory would predict that
a unanimous group will induce the naive subjects to reinterpret their
situation in Asch's study, it probably would not have predicted that a
single defector would drastically reduce the conformity effect. Game
theory would doubtless predict that the 5-1 majority would win over
many of the subjects,' 5 and yet most subjects easily resisted the group
pressure in this condition. Similarly, the law and social norms
theories would only have predicted part of the results in Darley's
helping studies-those conditions in which the group consists entirely
of confederates who refrained from helping. Where a group of
subjects were all naive, the dominant social norm was doubtless to
provide assistance, and yet fewer did so. Finally, although the results
of Bandura's bobo doll studies are probably not a surprise to the
social norms scholars, the insidious effect that social modeling has on
people's beliefs about themselves is not yet a part of the literature.
Social models have a much more lasting impression than social norms
scholarship recently admits. Although the basic lesson that groups
influence behavior is clear in the social psychological literature, social
influence is quite complicated.
The key lesson of these observations for the law and social norms
scholars is, ironically, not to underrate the power of social influence.
People are dynamic and active interpreters of the social settings they
encounter. Although people make many predictable errors of
judgment in social settings,11 6 they actively search out meaning and
make significant attributions about themselves that guide their
subsequent behavior. Rather than search for the hidden schedule of
costs and benefits that ostensibly give social norms their power to
115. See Picker, supra note 19 (developing models of social norms that assume increases in
the strength of a majority will increase its influence).
116. See generally RICHARD NISBETr & LEE ROSS, HUMAN INTERFERENCE:
SHORTCOMINGS OF SOCIAL JUDGMENT (1980) (documenting such errors).
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influence behavior, the law and social norms scholars should attend to
117
the influences that social psychology has documented.
B.

Situationism

The power of the situation to induce people to behave in ways
that are contrary to their social norms does not yet seem to be a part
of the law and social norms scholarship. In fact, this scholarship could
accommodate the results of the studies by Milgram and Darley and
Batson only by adopting a circular view of norms. That is, social
norms scholars could argue that these two studies simply introduced
more powerful social norms that overcame norms of decency. This
view would not tell a policymaker much about when one social norm
might triumph over another, at least not until after the fact.
The better view of the research conducted by Milgram and
Darley and Batson is that people tend to underestimate the coercive
power of situations to trump people's norms and preferences. The
studies are interesting sides of the same coin. Milgram demonstrated
that people are capable of destructive, even deadly, conduct under
circumstances that seem benign. Milgram's subjects did not behave
this way because they are people who espouse a destructive or violent
set of norms; they behaved this way because of the situation Milgram
created. Similarly, Darley and Batson's subjects did not help solely
because they were people who espouse altruistic norms, they helped
because they espoused such norms and had some extra time.
Situationism is particularly important for the social policy
implications of the social norms theories. Law and social norms
theorists argue that a neighborhood can cheaply send signals to
potential lawbreakers that will redefine their conduct by showing that
the neighborhood will not tolerate crime. Milgram's data suggest,
however, that crime is not a product of fear of retribution or an
undesirable character, but rather a product of a somewhat arbitrary
set of social pressures. Milgram managed to turn ordinary people
into criminals in under twenty minutes. An environment that
presents opportunities to commit crime and presents few obvious
alternatives to a comfortable life surely has an even greater affect on
decisions to engage in antisocial conduct. Tidying up neighborhoods
117. But see Richard A. Posner, Social Norms, Social Meaning, and Economic Analysis of
Law: A Comment, 27 J. LEGAL STUD. 553, 563 (1998). "[T]he subject of social norms can be
analyzed fruitfully in terms of economic theory conceived as the theory of rational individual
choice rather than as the study of conventional economic markets." Id.
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might deter some crime, but it is unlikely to channel people's
behavior into socially acceptable paths.
C. Social Norms in Tension
The concept of social forces in tension suggests a pragmatic, but
optimistic, point about social norms.
Social norms are truly
ubiquitous, and often in conflict. Therefore, there are two ways to
increase the rate of a desirable social behavior: either augment the
social forces that increase its prevalence or dampen those social
forces that reduce its prevalence. In other words, sometimes the
question is not what encourages people to do something, but rather
what discourages them from doing it.
Often, social reforms
emphasize the former issue to the neglect of the latter. The law and
social norms scholarship has done the same, to some extent. It has
claimed that slovenly neighborhoods make crime seem more
attractive than it really is, or should be, and therefore, a slovenly
neighborhood encourages people to commit crime instead of find
honest work. It may be that the reasons people do not find honest
work are more important determinants of criminal behavior than the
apparent attractiveness of crime.
D. Conclusion
Social psychology has a long and rich history of research on
social norms and how they function. Rather than incorporate this
work, the new scholarship on law and social norms has relied instead
on economics and game theory as its theoretical underpinnings. As
valuable as the insights from economics and game theory are, they
paint a somewhat impoverished portrait of humans as social animals.
It is certainly true that one of the reasons people conform to group
norms is the rewards of belonging that come with a group, be these
rewards financial remuneration or an enhanced sense of self-worth.
People are such subtle and active processors of their social worlds,
however, that the analysis must go further to reap any analytic fruit
and have any predictive power.
The basic lessons of social
psychology would do much to provide the predictive power that law
and social norms scholarship will otherwise lack.

